Rethinking Readiness: How States Are Leading on Disaster Preparedness

For the fourth consecutive year, the Florida Legislature passed a memorial asking Congress to address the shortfalls in its National Guard force structure. Despite being the third most populous state, Florida is only allocated enough Guardsmen to be the nation’s eleventh largest National Guard, meaning it has the second lowest citizen-guardsmen ratio, just behind California. In fact, Florida’s force allocation has been just over 12,000 since 1958. Though the Florida population has increased from 5 million in 1958 to over 22 million today, the Florida National Guard will continue to be capped at its current strength unless the National Guard Bureau increases its force allocation.

Despite Florida’s exploding population and frequent natural disasters, the National Guard Bureau has shown no sign that it will increase the Sunshine State’s National Guard allocation. So, for states in a similar predicament to Florida, understanding their alternative emergency response options is vital for preparing for future crises.

The National Guard Bureau’s process and metrics for determining each state’s force allocation are found in National Guard Regulation (NGR) 71-1 and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 38-101. The Army National Guard metrics include the Paid Strength to Force Structure Allowance Ratio (PS/FSA Ratio), Duty MOS Qualified (DMOSQ) Deployable Percent Fill, Equipment Readiness, and Unit Training Level Proficiency. Similarly, the Air National Guard metrics are based on operating manpower requirements and are integrated into the broader Air Force structure.

It is important to note that state-level factors such as population size or disaster vulnerability do not determine a state’s National Guard force allocation. Instead, it is determined primarily by the federal military mission priorities and, to a lesser extent, by the state’s stewardship of its current guardsmen. Further, NGR 71-1 explains that the Army National Guard “strives to limit changes to the Reserve Component (RC) force mix, when possible, to preserve resources and enable readiness.” This stems from 10 USC 18238, which limits the relocation of units in the Army and Air National Guard. Together, these provisions create a reluctance to increase one state’s force structure at the expense of another state.

Since gaining more National Guardsmen is unlikely, states must turn to alternative options for their disaster preparedness. Some examples include the State Guards and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.

State Guards, or State Defense Forces, are supplementary reserve units designed to augment the state’s preparedness during natural disasters, conflicts, or when their National Guard is deployed elsewhere. Gov. Ron DeSantis reestablished the Florida State Guard in 2022 in response to the National Guard Bureau’s decision not to increase Florida’s force allocation, joining 22 states that currently utilize these supplementary units. Unlike National Guard units, which are funded by the Department of Defense, these state militias are owned, operated, and funded solely by their home state.

State Guards have a similar training schedule to the National Guard, but State Guardsmen are generally unpaid unless activated for state emergencies. This allows a state to augment its emergency preparedness without significant cost. The Virginia State Defense Force, Texas State Guard, and California State Guard, for example, require less than 1 percent of the state’s defense preparedness budget to operate and provide significant support during emergencies.

Another mechanism that states can turn to during a crisis is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Established in 1996, the EMAC provides a legal framework for sharing resources between states, including National Guard and State Guard troops. The compact was last invoked during Hurricanes Milton and Helene to provide support to Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Georgia. In total, over 7,600 Guardsmen from 19 states were mobilized through EMAC to support the affected areas.

While increasing a state’s National Guard size would bolster its emergency preparedness, the persistent tension between federal priorities and states’ needs requires states to augment their readiness through other means. Operating a supplementary State Guard and receiving aid from neighboring states has allowed states like Florida to respond to disasters effectively. By leveraging these alternatives, states can help ensure their citizens have access to quick and effective emergency response resources in times of need.